Modelling based on probabilistic inference can be used to estimate the quality of information delivered by a military sensor network. Different modelling tools have complementary characteristics that can be leveraged to create an accurate model open to intuitive and efficient querying. In particular, stochastic process models can be used to abstract away from the physical reality by describing it as components that exist in discrete states with probabilistically invoked actions that change the state. The quality of information may be assessed by using the model to compute the probability that reports made by the network to its users are correct. In contrast, dynamic Bayesian network models, which have been used in a variety of military applications, are a more suitable vehicle for understanding the overall network performance and making inferences about the quality of information. Queries can be made simply by instantiating some variables and computing the probability distributions over others. We show that it is possible to combine both modelling tools by constructing a Bayesian network over the state variables of the process algebra model. The sparsity of the resulting Bayesian network allows fast propagation of probabilities, and hence interactive querying for the quality of information.
INTRODUCTION
Computer networks have been studied extensively over forty years with a view to optimizing performance in terms of throughput and latency while minimizing cost. Measures of quality of service have become popular in defining the responsiveness of a network in information delivery. More recently, attention has turned to the quality of information delivered by a network. Instead of asking questions such as 'how long will it take to get a reply to my query?' network designers are asking questions such as 'how accurate is the information that is received?'. These questions are of particular importance in military networks. In a typical military application a wireless sensor network will have to process its information in difficult and dynamic conditions. There are high risks that the sensors will report incorrect information and that nodes may fail to communicate with each other. Moreover, the information passed across the network will in general be safety, or mission, critical, and thus a knowledge of the quality of information is important in making choices about data fusion and sensor to mission matching.
The concept of 'quality of information' is difficult to define formally since it depends on the information semantics. It is a measure of how well a piece of information delivered to a user describes a situation or event of interest to that user. For example, in a military context information could take the form of a pixel image of a battlefield scene. It is a simple matter to calculate a measure of information content using, for example, the entropy of the pixel intensity distribution. However, the quality of that information depends on the use to which the image is to be put. If it suffers from arteifacts that, for example, prevent reading signs and symbols on vehicles it may be considered low quality by a user interested in detailed surveillance. On may be considered high quality by a battlefield commander. Hence the quality of information must be assessed in relation to the expectation of the user.
Designers of military networks aim to maximize their reliability through the use of techniques such as data replication. Many nodes will be used, some placed in areas of engagement where the environment is unfavourable and others in close proximity to the base station where information is to be delivered. There may be an ad-hoc network connection path joining the area of engagement to the base station, and the movement of nodes will affect communication. In modern network-centric warfare the number of nodes could become huge, ultimately with each soldier carrying a node. In these circumstances the node performance will be limited by power consumption, the local environment and the characteristics of the engagement. Under these conditions bespoke network modelling of network performance is clearly unfeasible, and estimating the quality of information available from the network can only be achieved through some form of abstraction.
A stochastic process algebra can be used as a modelling tool which enables us to abstract the salient features from networks with a specified data distribution protocol, in a deployment where the characteristics are known or parameterized. The resulting model can be used to determine the performance of the network in terms of defined operational characteristics, and thus assess its reliability. From this the quality of information can be investigated under different operational scenarios. Modelling of this kind can be used in choosing between different design strategies for implementing military sensor networks, and in assessing the likely quality of information available from networks under different operational plans and scenarios.
Information quality has been traditionally studied within the context of data collected and maintained by large industrial and governmental information systems [1] [2] [3] . In military sensorbased applications, quality of information has been considered only in very limited situations where, for example, metrics have been used to assess the accuracy of location estimation of target tracking applications [4] [5] [6] . However, the highly dynamic and unpredictable nature of sensor operations in military situations can have significant impact on the quality of derived information requiring, along with the location estimation (or, more generally, fusion) processes, a more comprehensive, computationally effective modelling of the sensor data gathering and communication processes as well. Field observations can be affected by the limitations of the sensing channel, the sensing operation itself, and the communications path between the sensor and the fusion centre. As a result, field observations will provide an imperfect picture of the real world. This uncertainty can be represented by a probability distribution or density function over parameter values.
The objective of this research is to introduce modelling and analysis techniques for sensor-enabled missions that will quantify the uncertainty in the data and will provide a means to estimate the quality of information expected from different configurations of the sensors and network nodes. Modelling of this kind will be of significant benefit in the design and parameter optimization of military sensor networks used in different operational plans and scenarios. Our previous work [7] has demonstrated the feasibility of using a compositional stochastic process algebra as a formalism for describing military sensor networks and computing probability distributions over events of interest. We extend that work here by using dynamic Bayesian networks in making inferences about the quality of information.
We note here that this piece of work is part of a broad research effort within the International Technological Alliance (ITA) research programme to study the multi-faceted topic of quality of information for sensor data. This effort comprises a number of research threads. The thread of research to which this work belongs considers modelling, analytical and computational techniques for quality of information. Centred around the probability of detection, Bisdikian [8] has looked into the relationship between sensor operation, application characteristics and quality of information in a single-sensor event detection system. Extensions considering missing sensor measurements have also been studied [9, 10] , and Zahedi et al. [11] introduced a modular computational framework for multi-stage, multi-sensor event detection systems. A second research thread has considered sensor system designs and architectures for detecting and compensating for faulty sensors whose operation could affect the quality of information they produce [12] , and compensating for clock drifts that can affect the accuracy of localization algorithms [13] . A third thread of research has considered the quality of information in relation to sensor network operations, such as network transport services and congestion management [14, 15] , energy consumption [16] and QoS-aware routing [17] . Finally, a new thread of research pursues the broader implications of quality of information and its characterization [18] , including the principle of organizing meta-information with the purpose of hastening the discovery of relevant information.
In the remainder of the paper we shall introduce a simple military scenario, and show how it can be modelled using a stochastic process algebra formulation. We shall then show how an equivalent Bayesian belief network can be constructed. We describe how queries about the quality of information can be made from the Bayesian network, and compare query results with those obtained from the stochastic model. We conclude with a discussion of the current research issues in estimating the quality of information delivered by military sensor networks. Figure 1 shows a very simple military tracking scenario. In this illustrative example, the command centre must be made aware of the location of a target which is patrolling along the opposite bank of the river. Two sensors are set up to detect its movement, and to report its approximate position. There is a node associated with each sensor and the nodes can communicate with each other through wireless links. Node 1 is close enough to the command centre to be able to communicate directly with it. However node 2 is too far and must send its information via node 1. The command centre receives reports, which may have originated from the sensor in either location. The sensors detect the presence of the target acoustically. The area where they are placed is the site of a military engagement, and the acoustic environment is confused by sounds of gunfire and low flying helicopters. When the ambient noise levels are high, the sensor may fail to detect the presence of the target, or may receive false positive information.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
This simple scenario captures many of the characteristics of deployment of military sensor networks, and can be easily extended to more complex examples. It is clear that notwithstanding its simplicity, a complete physical model of this scenario would be prohibitively complex for the purposes of real-time calculation of performance. Instead, we use the information available to calculate a suitable abstraction which preserves the necessary features of the interactions which will allow us to make estimates of the quality of information delivered to the command centre.
The most common way to abstract from a physical system is to use a state-space representation, and this approach is adopted in most network modelling work. In the scenario of Fig. 1 each component of the system is modelled by a discrete state variable with a small number of states that are set out in Table 1 . For example, the target is modelled by variable T which has two states, one indicating that the target is in the vicinity of node 1 (location 1) and the other indicating that the target is in the vicinity of node 2. Variable N 1 describes node 1, and has four states that express the communication actions of the node and its current belief state about the presence of the target. The variables that relate to node 2, N 2, S2 and AE2 are omitted from the table and are defined in a manner corresponding to the variables describing the behaviour of node 1. At any instant in time the model is in a single joint state. 
T T1Active
The target is active in location 1 T 2Active
The target is active in location 2
AE1 AE0in1
There is no acoustic interference in location 1 AE1in1
There is acoustic interference in location 1 S1 S1Active Sensor 1 is active S1Sampling Sensor 1 is sampling S1Heard
Sensor 1 has detected the target N 1 N 1Receive1 Node 1 has recorded that the target is in location 1 N 1Receive2 Node 1 has recorded that the target is in location 2 N 1Send1
Node 1 tells node 2 that the target is in location 1 N 1Send2
Node 1 tells node 2 that the target is in location 2
A A1at1
The command believes that the target is at location 1 A1at2
The command believes that the target is at location 2
The variables in AE2, S2 and N 2 in location 2 are not included and are defined similar to their counterparts in location 1.
PROCESS ALGEBRA MODELS OF MILITARY SENSOR NETWORKS
Having defined a set of state variables, we can describe a behaviour using a stochastic process algebra. In this we specify a set of stochastically invoked actions that cause changes of the states of variables. A full introduction to stochastic process algebras and their applications can be found in Jane Hillston's Needham Lecture [19] . Process algebras were developed with the goal of producing formally verifiable, transformable and comparable models of processes. Timed stochastic process algebras were developed for use in modelling real systems with temporal behaviours. They are supported by a number of toolsets for direct computation of equilibrium and transient probability distributions over the states of the model. This contrasts with the use of Monte Carlo and related simulation techniques in which extensive computing resources are required. These distribution-based models provide formalisms [20, 21] and tools for solution and model checking [22] [23] [24] which can be used for the development and validation of models of military sensor networks. Toolsets for directly manipulating hybrid continuousdiscrete systems are being developed, but have not yet reached the level of maturity for application to military sensor networks.
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The discrete variables describing the network form components of the stochastic process algebra that also incorporate actions with associated execution time distributions, which lead to transitions between the states. The state of the whole system, at any time, is defined by the current state of each individual component. State changes are invoked stochastically with probabilities drawn from a Poisson distribution. Thus the model moves through a chain of states according to the combined actions of the components. This is a Markov chain, for which a rich set of mathematical manipulation and solution tools exist. The Markov chain is represented as a vector of states and a transition matrix of Poisson rates.
There is no restriction to using only Poisson models, however, they provide a simple and intuitive solution which forms a good approximation in many practical applications. There are mature toolsets for solving semi-Markov chains embodying more general distributions. The use of other distributions requires detailed knowledge of the application.
Each action follows a probabilistic description of its duration in the model. The resulting stochastic model captures the potential evolutions of the system as a locus annotated with a probability measure. For example, the model could provide a probability distribution over the potential locations of a moving target. This enables the specification of a time-dependent evolution of entities interacting over specified actions. For example, a sensor may not detect an acoustic event if it is masked by its acoustic environment. In a stochastic process algebra model, we create this behaviour by requiring the sensor, the target and the acoustic environment to co-operate over a hearing action. If one of these three components does not make the hearing action available, it will not occur.
With a suitably constructed model, we may examine selected outcomes, or groups of outcomes, in terms of their probability during some form of equilibrium or mean behaviour, or as a transient response. An equilibrium behaviour may represent the distribution of target locations in an on-going monitoring scenario, and perhaps specifically coinciding with certain events. For example, the location distribution at the arrival of a tracking update from a sensor network will provide a measure of the predictable accuracy of such an update. A transient response takes a starting state description, and provides the state distribution at a set instant in time thereafter. For example, we may calculate the probability distribution of a target location as a function of time in the period between updates from a sensor network.
The actions in a Markov chain model proceed as Poisson processes, which have a fixed form of a probability distribution function over the time between transitions or sojourn time in the source state with one parameter: the rate constant. The distribution function of time delays between Poisson events is λe −λt , where t is the free variable time and λ the parameter that we may set. This distribution decreases monotonically. Models based on continuous-time Markov chains are commonly employed in the estimation of mean behaviours.
The actor in the command centre, sensors, network nodes, target and acoustic environments are modelled as the individual components shown in Fig. 2 . The components of the system are shown boxed, and actions over which components co-operate are shown as shaded ellipses. For example, the sensor in location 1 has an action t1hear, which co-operates with the identically labelled action available in the target model. The target can only carry out this action when it is in location 1, and therefore susceptible to detection by the sensor. The acoustic environment also co-operates in this action when it is quiet and does not mask the sound of the target. The action only occurs when all three components co-operate. The sensor in location 2 will not detect the target, because it is not present in location 2 to satisfy the co-operation on the action t2hear. When a network node receives a report from its local sensor or from another node in the network, it immediately prepares to send that information to the larger network. A sensor's detection of the target will eventually be reported to all locations in the system. Full details of the implementation of this model, including the use of the equilibrium solution in the calculations have been published previously [7] .
Each state in the Markov chain derived from Fig. 2 is a joint state of all the component processes. For example, one such joint state could represent an instant when both sensors are active but not sampling, the target is in location 1, the actor believes the target to be in location 2, the network node in location 1 is ready to send to the node in location 2 a message stating that the target is in location 2 and both acoustic environments are loud. This state, whose probability we can compute from the model, is one where the command centre may not receive good information.
On receiving a report specifying the location of the target, the command's perception of the target location is updated. The most trivial update would be to adopt the prima facie interpretation of the report: the target is now where this report states it to be. However, sensing, data transmission and fusion FIGURE 2. An illustration of the actions over which the components in a tracking model co-operate to achieve transfer of information from the target to the consumer; the target is shown as explicitly occupying one of two possible locations; the action required for sensing (t2hear) is not enabled in a location from which the target is absent.
are imperfect, and so the behaviours leading to that imperfection must be modelled to enable an interpretation pertinent to the intended use of the information. For example, it is possible to calculate the probability distribution over potential locations of the target at the instant of arrival of a message from the local network node stating that it is present, specifically changing the command's opinion from 'the target is at location 2' to 'the target is at location 1'.
Solution for the equilibrium state occupation probabilities of the system is a fundamental result when analysing a Markov chain. The majority of interesting results are constructed using its probabilities, including the rates of the reversed process [25] . To construct the required probability distribution, we consider the circumstances in terms of the n1here action, which asserts that the target is in location 1 changing the belief of the command centre. This is a Poisson process, and hence on entry to a state which is a target of that transition, we can take the subset of states which are reached by that action and normalize their probabilities from the total equilibrium. We can do this because of the random observer property [26] .
The state occupation probabilities in the continuous Markov chain of the model at an independent instant conform to the equilibrium distribution found by solution of the ChapmanKolmogorov probability flux balance equations [26] . We consider the possibility that the information delivered by the network leads the command into believing, incorrectly, that the target is in location 1. Define F as a set of indices of states in which the command's belief is that the target is in location 1. Define H similarly for states in which the target is actually in location 1. As the model progresses through a Markov chain we are interested in points where the observed state is indexed in F , and the previous state is not indexed in F . These represent the points at which the command adopts the belief that the target is in location 1. We can calculate the probability of such observed states being indexed in H , and this probability is one measure that we can associate with the quality of information delivered by the network. Table 2 shows some probabilities of this kind, calculated from the model shown in Fig. 2 , for differing rates of interference in the acoustic environment. The rates determine how quickly the noise in the environment clears to silence. A lower rate means a longer time in which the sensor cannot hear the target. The first column indicates the command's change of state. For example, '2 to 1' means that the command changes to believing that the target is in location 1. The second column shows the location in which the acoustic clearing rates have been changed. If a location was not varied, its acoustic clearing rate was set to 10.
The rates used to generate these results are contrived to show that different parts of the system can interact in different ways. We would expect the probability of the target being where the network reports it to drop with higher noise levels, and this is the case when we vary the acoustic environments symmetrically. However, we can pick rates for the system which lead to counterintuitive results, as seen in the non-monotonic response when Full details of these calculations, including the use of the equilibrium solution, have been published in our recent paper [7] .
the environments are differentially varied. This means that an intuitive result from a single test run of a system should not be regarded as proof that the behaviour will follow expectations under all conditions. The trend for lower quality information production in noisy environments is expected. The use of a timed analytic stochastic model enables us to strictly quantify the effect of the interplay between the operating environment and the system parameters on the perception of the user.
USING A BAYESIAN NETWORK FORMALISM FOR INFERENCE
Stochastic process algebras are highly appropriate tools for modelling military sensor networks, but there are other probabilistic formalisms describing the behaviour of discrete random variables that offer different ways of making inferences from the data. The principal advantage of the stochastic process algebra model is that it sets out explicitly how the system will behave. It does this by associating timed actions with the components. The same set of discrete variables, for example those in Table 1 , can be modelled by a Bayesian network, and this formulation, while lacking the operational description implied by the stochastic process algebra, has major advantages in terms of making inferences and in investigating models with dynamic behaviour. Bayesian networks provide a simple and intuitive way of representing the causal relationships between a set of variables. These causal relationships are well understood by military personnel, and can be used to encapsulate the user expectations that are a necessary part of defining the quality of information. The Bayesian network model and the stochastic process algebra model can be made equivalent in the sense that both represent the same joint probability distribution over the state variables. However the Bayesian network is more abstract because it does not contain any information on the temporal behaviour of the independent components. Its parameters represent an integration of the temporal behaviour over a finite 6 D. Gillies et al. time interval. In this application we do not intend to explore the causal dependencies between one time point and the next. Instead we look on the Bayesian network as representing the causal information of the network at a set time, and calculate how the causal structure changes over time.
Bayesian networks have proved to be intuitive modelling and inference tools in many applications. They have been applied to a number of different military scenarios. Static networks have been proposed for situation awareness [27] [28] [29] and for assessing threat in airborne and other environments [30, 31] . They provide good causal information, which can be used to explore relationships in battle spaces [32] . Dynamic Bayesian networks have been used to model certain tasks in the military domain such as target tracking [33] [34] [35] , multisensor fusion [36] , inferencing about opposing plans [37] and representing uncertain environments [38] . In the past dynamic Bayesian networks have usually been seen as causal networks where each variable is influenced by its neighbours, and by its state at the previous time step. In this respect a dynamic Bayesian network is equivalent to a Markov model [39] .
There are two major advantages of using a Bayesian network representation. The first is that it is a compact representation of a discrete space. One of the major problems in modelling the quality of information in a large sensor network is the explosion of the state space. In the simple example in Fig. 2 , there is already a total of 2304 states, and the size increases dramatically with the number of variables. In practice, in the case of large networks, many of the variable pairs will be independent, or at least conditionally independent. Taking these independencies into account allows us to represent the joint probability distribution by a small number of conditional probability tables, rather than by an unwieldy, sparse transition matrix. The second advantage of the Bayesian network representation is that it gives us a causal picture from which to do reasoning. In the case of a military network there is a causal chain from the events being monitored (T , AE1 and AE2) to the users requiring the information (A). The causal structure is shown in Fig. 3 .
In practice we are not interested in modelling the transfer of information between the sensors and the nodes since they are directly coupled. More significantly, the node states are different in nature since the sensor has no memory. It samples the environment, and if it hears the target it reports it to the node, but does not record whether it has heard the target or not. In contrast the node maintains a record of what information it has received about the presence of the target. Its belief about the position of the target is encoded by the last digit of the state name. When making inferences we are primarily concerned about these belief states, and hence use the Bayesian belief network, which is shown in Fig. 4 .
The causal structure of the belief network is of particular importance in the estimation of the quality of information, since it encapsulates the purpose for which the network is intended. Previous approaches [5] have suggested that quality of information may be measured by the distributional distance between the ground truth and the data provided by the network. The ground truth distribution is the expectation of the data that would ideally be delivered during the operation of a military sensor network. This is not known in practice, and the question of how to specify it is the subject of current military research [40] . Knowing the causal structure allows us to avoid explicitly expressing the ground truth. Instead we can query the network in a simple intuitive interactive manner. For example we can instantiate the variable A, specifying, for example, that the command centre believes that the target is in location 1, and then calculate the probability distribution over the states of the variable T . The quality of information can be measured by comparing this distribution with the ideal expectation where the distribution of T is [1, 0] over the states [T 1Active, T 2Active].
One simple and attractive way to find a Bayesian network that models the equilibrium joint probability distribution of a continuous-time Markov chain is to draw a time series of samples from the Markov chain, and use these to calculate the dependencies and conditional probabilities that link the variables. The resulting Bayesian network is of course only approximate since it models exactly the joint probability of the samples. This is not a major problem, as any practical network will operate in a dynamic manner, without a definite point of equilibrium. The construction of a Bayesian network from a stream of samples is computationally very efficient. All that is required is to update the dependency graph and probability tables with each new sample. This can be done by building a co-occurrence table for the states of each variable pair, and incrementing the appropriate entry at the arrival of each new sample. The table can then be normalized into a joint probability table, and further normalized to find the conditional probability tables that link each variable according to the causal structure. For more complex patterns of causality, where one variable may be influenced by multiple causes, further computation may be required to obtain the conditional probabilities. It is easy to adapt this construction method to cope with the dynamic nature of the military sensor network. All that is required is to maintain a circular buffer of samples, and at each update of the co-occurrence tables remove the oldest sample before inserting the latest arrival. Thus the dependency structure that is calculated is constrained to represent the network behaviour over a controlled moving time window. An alternative, 'windowless' implementation, can be made by weighting the samples according to their position in the time series. This may be done by multiplying the co-occurrence tables by a forgetting factor before adding in each new sample, thus attaching more importance to recent samples.
RESULTS
To investigate these ideas further Bayesian belief networks were created from the samples drawn from the stochastic process algebra model shown in Fig. 2 . Two sampling regimes were investigated, the first was sampling at equal time intervals and the second involved picking samples at each change of state of the Markov model. In practice, both methods gave similar results, and reducing the sample interval would make the two methods converge. For samples drawn at 500 ms intervals the parameters of the Bayesian network began to stabilize around 2000 samples indicating that a time window of around 20 mins was sufficient to collect the data. This time window will in general be dependent on the slowest changing component, which, in the case of our illustrative example, was the target. The results presented below use the second sampling regime.
Once constructed a network can be queried by computing the probability of all free variable states for a specific instantiation. Castro and Muntz [41] proposed using the entropy of a query variable in a Bayesian network as a measure of the quality of information. This is an appealing idea since it is generally applicable, but in practice it is difficult to infer much from the network nodes themselves.
Consider the conditional probability table linking node 2 with its parents (Table 3) . To understand what these conditional probabilities mean, we can add together rows 1 and 3, in which node 2 believes the target to be in location 1, and rows 2 and 4 in which node 2 believes the target to be in location 2. This creates the simpler conditional probability table shown in Table 4 .
Column 2 of Table 4 represents the case where the sensor and the target are close together in a noise-free environment. We see that the probabilities in this column are close to 0 or 1, and hence it has low entropy. Evidence will be passed between the nodes for these states. Column 1 in Table 4 has higher entropy, which is accounted for by the fact that the information about the whereabouts of the target comes not from node 2 itself, but from the node in location 1, possibly corrupted by noise. The conditional probabilities are closer to 0.5 and so less evidence is passed between the nodes for these states. The last two columns in Table 4 still have higher entropy, due to the random disturbance of the noise, suggesting that little evidence is being exchanged and the information on which the beliefs are formed is of lower quality. For the case where we instantiate both T and AE2, and no other nodes, the probability distribution over the states of N 2 will be just the entries in the corresponding column of the conditional probability table. These changes in the entropy of the nodes reflect the operation of specific parts of the network and, though interesting, do not generalize easily to an overall measure of the quality of information received by the command centre, particularly in cases where there are many network nodes involved in the transmission of the data.
More intuitive measures can be provided by considering queries that encapsulate the purpose of the network. A given instantiation can be used to define a ground truth, and we can assess the quality of information delivered by the network by examining the belief states of the other nodes to determine how far they differ from the ground truth. For example, if we instantiate the location of the target to T 2Active, we can then compute a probability distribution over all other variables. In particular we would be interested in the belief states of the command centre since the probability of A1at2, with that instantiation, would directly represent the quality of the information being received. Table 5 shows these probabilities calculated for the same conditions that were used to generate the data of Table 2 . The results show a similar trend, but have more variance. This is to be expected as we are integrating over time, and rather than looking at specific events we are looking at the combined effects of the noise, transport delays and race hazards. At low levels the noise has little influence since its timing is comparable with other network events. At high levels it dominates the quality of information. We can investigate other possible instantiations and their effect on the quality of information. For example we can instantiate the acoustic environment nodes with virtual evidence to investigate the effect of changing the noise environment on the queries. Table 6 shows the effect of instantiating AE2 in the case where the target is at location 2. The mean noise rate was set at 0.1. The results show the predictable trend that the quality of information declines as the noise increases. In practice these probabilities represent an expectation based The results are generated by instantiating the target node and querying the command centre node. The effect of increasing the level of noise on the quality of information is clearly demonstrated. The top line shows the probability assigned to state AE0in2 (no acoustic interference in location 2), and the second line the probability of the command belief that the target is indeed at location 2. The quality of information declines predictably with the increasing probability of noise.
on the timings expressed in the process algebra model. We would get a different result if we changed the rates of acoustic environment in the stochastic process algebra model before generating the Bayesian network. Another possibility is to investigate the failure of a node. For example, failure of node 1 can be investigated simply by removing the arc between node 1 and node 2. This can be achieved by marginalizing the conditional probability table over the states of node2 and re-normalizing. Doing this for the case where the target is at 2 reduces the probability of belief state A1at2 to 0.469, indicating that the information is effectively random. This is not surprising since the only information about location 2 comes through node 2. The probability of A1at1 when the target is actually at 1 is also considerably reduced to 0.62 in the failed network. This is because node 1 no longer receives any information on the belief state of node 2, and hence its susceptibility to noise is greater. Queries of this kind would form useful ways of exploring larger redundant networks where the effects of failure may not be so obvious.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper we have explored the use of probabilistic methods in estimating the quality of information that can be obtained from a military sensor network in a particular deployment. We have demonstrated the potential of these probabilistic methods by using them on a simple military network scenario. We have shown that stochastic process algebra can capture a network behaviour in a time-dependent manner, and can create formal models of the total sensing and response problem at different levels of abstraction. Stochastic modelling is directly related to the physics of measurement and allows us to reason about network performance and timings. We have argued that Bayesian belief networks represent a further abstraction from the physical reality and offer a simple and intuitive approach to making queries about the quality of information offered by a sensor network. We have presented a simple scheme for deriving a dynamic Bayesian network from an underlying stochastic process algebra model. One of the most attractive features of the Bayesian belief network is that it provides an intuitive interface in which users can formulate bespoke queries about the quality of information that relate to their particular information requirements.
This work opens up a number of exciting research questions which will form the basis of our future work.
Knowledge of the dependencies between different components of the network can be used to construct visualizations illustrating the dynamic behaviour and providing a qualitative assessment of its performance. The degree of dependence of nodes will indicate the level to which they are co-operating in the model. Intuitively we would expect that components acting independently and asynchronously would show zero or low dependency. For example, there is no dependency between the two acoustic environment variables in the above example. For bigger networks we would expect low dependency between remote sensor nodes that cannot communicate with each other. Conversely, there would be considerable dependence between local groups of nodes, which regularly pass messages to each other. Thus cliques in the dependency graph indicate places where the information is being readily exchanged with little or no loss of quality. These could be simplified in the underlying SPA model by combining the individual components' state spaces. Conversely paths of low dependency would indicate places where the network is likely to operate less effectively. Associating dependency paths with the physical location of the components of the network will provide an effective qualitative visualization method as the structure of a network changes.
We need to consider in depth dynamic changes in a network that we are analysing. We briefly showed the effect of node failure, but other dynamics are harder to capture. For example when nodes move their ability to communicate will change. This re-configuration of the network may have a radical influence on the quality of information that is obtained.
We need to validate our measures of quality of information, and consider other possible metrics such as the Bayes error or the Fisher information. At present, the measures we propose can be used to compare the performance of different putative network configurations, but cannot be treated as absolute. To provide an absolute measure we need to calibrate our models against network performance in real physical environments. This is a big task, and our current research seeks to address it in a practical way by modelling and analysing different types of sensor, multiple sensor deployments in a given location, network protocol design and mission characteristics. Eventually it may be possible to set up some experiments tracking the information flow in real sensor networks, and to develop methods of self-appraisal for networks in real deployments.
At the moment we do not deal with rare events that are commonly assessed using model checking over the stochastic process algebra model. The Bayesian nets are intended for higher-level inferencing, and the time window is currently optimized for the example given. In future work we plan to investigate how the integration time relates to specific aspects of a mission.
Another long-term goal is to investigate how planning under uncertainty using Markovian processes [42, 43] may be combined with our measures of quality of information to optimize the performance of a sensor network.
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